Russian APT Static Tundra Unleashes Devastating Cyber Assault on Poland’s Critical Infrastructure

In a chilling demonstration of modern cyber warfare, Russian-linked threat actors have executed a coordinated campaign of destruction against Poland’s energy infrastructure, marking one of the most sophisticated and damaging cyberattacks in recent European history.

The Attack: A Multi-Pronged Assault on National Security

On December 29, 2025, CERT Polska revealed that Static Tundra—a cyber-espionage group with deep ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 unit—launched simultaneous attacks against over 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a major manufacturing company, and a critical combined heat and power (CHP) plant serving nearly half a million customers.

The attack represents a calculated escalation in Russia’s cyber campaign against NATO-aligned nations, employing destructive malware specifically designed to cripple industrial control systems and energy production capabilities.

The Adversary: Static Tundra’s Growing Threat

Static Tundra operates under numerous aliases including Berserk Bear, Blue Kraken, Crouching Yeti, Dragonfly, Energetic Bear, and Ghost Blizzard. This highly sophisticated APT group has demonstrated advanced capabilities in infiltrating industrial control systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, and critical infrastructure across multiple sectors.

What makes this attack particularly concerning is the emergence of DynoWiper, a custom-built malware variant specifically engineered to target energy infrastructure. At least four different versions of this destructive wiper have been identified, each more advanced than the last.

The Weapons: Custom Malware Engineered for Destruction

DynoWiper: The Energy Sector’s Nightmare

DynoWiper represents a new generation of cyber weapons specifically designed for industrial sabotage. The malware operates through a three-stage process:

1. Initialization: Seeds a Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator for maximum entropy
2. Corruption: Systematically corrupts files using the PRNG algorithm
3. Destruction: Permanently deletes compromised files

The malware was deployed directly on Mikronika HMI Computers used by energy facilities and distributed through network shares within the CHP plant. Access was achieved through vulnerable FortiGate SSL-VPN portals, highlighting the critical importance of securing perimeter devices.

LazyWiper: The Manufacturing Sector’s Destroyer

In the attack against the manufacturing company, Static Tundra deployed LazyWiper, a PowerShell-based variant that overwrites files with pseudorandom 32-byte sequences, rendering data completely unrecoverable. Security analysts suspect this variant was developed using large language models (LLMs), representing a concerning evolution in malware development techniques.

The Methodology: Sophisticated and Calculated

The attackers employed multiple sophisticated techniques to achieve their objectives:

• Long-term infiltration: The CHP plant attack involved data theft dating back to March 2025, allowing the threat actors to establish persistent access and map network architectures
• Lateral movement: Once inside networks, attackers used compromised credentials to move laterally across systems
• Cloud targeting: After compromising on-premises environments, attackers attempted to access cloud services including Microsoft 365, targeting Exchange, Teams, and SharePoint
• Tor network obfuscation: Attackers used Tor nodes alongside compromised infrastructure to mask their activities

The Impact: Disruption Without Catastrophe

While the attacks were “purely destructive” in nature, CERT Polska reports that the damage was less severe than the attackers intended:

• Renewable energy farms: Communication disruptions occurred, but electricity production continued
• CHP plant: Heat supply to customers remained uninterrupted despite the attack
• Manufacturing sector: Operational impact limited to data destruction

This outcome suggests either defensive measures were effective or the attackers failed to achieve their full destructive potential.

The Vulnerability: A Wake-Up Call

The attacks exploited critical security weaknesses:

• Static credentials: Multiple accounts were statically defined in device configurations without two-factor authentication
• Vulnerable perimeter devices: Fortinet FortiGate appliances served as initial access points
• Legacy systems: Industrial control systems lacked adequate security controls

The Attribution: Competing Theories

While CERT Polska attributes the attacks to Static Tundra with high confidence, recent reports from ESET and Dragos suggest Sandworm (another Russian state-sponsored group) may have been responsible, though with only moderate confidence. The code-level similarities between DynoWiper and other wipers attributed to Sandworm are described as “general” in nature, leaving attribution uncertain.

The Response: Enhanced Security Measures

In response to these attacks, CERT Polska recommends:

• Immediate patching of all Fortinet devices
• Implementation of two-factor authentication for all critical systems
• Network segmentation to isolate industrial control systems
• Enhanced monitoring of industrial networks for anomalous activity
• Regular security assessments of critical infrastructure

The Implications: A New Era of Cyber Warfare

These attacks represent a significant escalation in Russia’s cyber operations against NATO-aligned nations. The targeting of energy infrastructure—particularly renewable energy facilities—demonstrates a strategic focus on disrupting the transition to sustainable energy sources and creating economic instability.

The use of custom-developed wipers specifically designed for industrial control systems marks a concerning evolution in cyber warfare capabilities. These tools are not merely destructive; they are engineered to maximize operational disruption while minimizing detection.

The Future: Preparing for the Next Wave

As critical infrastructure becomes increasingly digitized and interconnected, the attack surface for sophisticated threat actors continues to expand. The Static Tundra attacks serve as a stark reminder that:

• No sector is immune from state-sponsored cyber operations
• Legacy security approaches are inadequate against modern threats
• Critical infrastructure requires military-grade cybersecurity defenses
• International cooperation is essential for threat intelligence sharing

The question is not whether similar attacks will occur, but when and where the next wave will strike. Organizations across all critical sectors must assume they are targets and prepare accordingly.

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